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Abstract 
Between 1998 and 2005, we identify 74 cross-border M&A transactions in which 
international banks acquired ownership stakes in 46 listed banks in emerging market 
economies (EME). A total of $1,057,515 million of bank assets was acquired for $38,172 
million in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia. Using an event study 
approach, there is scant evidence of win-win situations when joint abnormal return is 
positive. Whereas abnormal returns to targets are mostly positive and significant, they 
tend to be offset by negative returns to acquiring banks, which drives joint returns. 
Econometric results find no evidence that acquisition of majority control leads to higher 
abnormal returns to target banks; rather, the opposite holds in banking which is 
inconsistent with evidence from the non-financial sector. Our evidence implies there are 
considerable perceived risks associated with expanding banking operations into emerging 
markets, which affects stockmarket valuation of cross-border M&A. Thus, the evidence 
does not support suggestions of a transfer of wealth from shareholders in emerging 
markets to their counterparts in industrialised markets. 
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1. Introduction 
The international consolidation of the banking industry is following hard on the heels of 
the extensive domestic consolidation process that has taken place mostly in the US and 
Europe since the mid-1980s (see Berger et al, 1999, 2000).2 Throughout the 1990s and 
into the new millennium, banks from industrialised countries (referred to as international 
banks) have been acquiring banks in emerging market economies (EME) at an increasing 
pace mainly via cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The increase in the level 
of foreign ownership of domestic banking assets has been dramatic, particularly in the 
transition economies and some Latin American countries (Bonin et al, 2005). Recent 
survey evidence reports that international banks are tending to enter EME by acquiring an 
ownership stake in target institutions (Clarke et al, 2003; BIS, 2004).3  
 
Large, relatively poor countries are targets for international banks using cross-border 
M&A as means to reach a widely spaced population; cross-border M&A is also related 
positively to shared language and geographical proximity (Buch and DeLong, 2001). 
Countries that are relatively more open are likely to receive a higher share of cross-border 
M&A activity (Buch and DeLong, 2001; Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001). Focarelli and 
Pozzolo (2001) claim large banks originating from competitive, well regulated domestic 
markets are more likely to expand overseas (supporting Berger et al, 2000). Cost 
efficiency is suggested to be more important than the overall degree of economic 
integration in explaining the internationalisation of the banking industry. Slager (2004) 
contextualises motives for M&A in terms of the internationalisation of banking. Several 
motives are cited: banks follow customers to new markets; to increase earnings and 
diversify risk; to exploit growth potential in host countries; to circumvent limited growth 
opportunities in highly concentrated home markets; to realise efficiency gains. 
 
                                               
2  The causes of the consolidation of US and European banking as well as the possible outcomes are 
discussed by various authors including Berger et al (1999), Berger (2000), Berger et al (2000), Berger et al 
(2001), Berger and DeYoung (2001), Berger and DeYoung (2002), and Berger et al (2003). 
3 Purchasing an established branch network is one mode by which acquiring banks access underdeveloped, 
but potentially large, retail banking markets that exist in many EME. Other investment options include 
taking a minority stake in a target bank and increasing it over time, or entering into a joint venture 
agreement. We note that hostile takeovers in banking are very rare and foreign bank takeovers are subject 
to regulations which vary between countries. 
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Event study methods determine if M&A deals generate value for bank shareholders by 
yielding an abnormal return around the announcement date. The empirical literature 
points to mixed evidence from US and European markets. The empirical evidence from 
the US suggests value gains are distributed in favour of target bank shareholders at the 
expense of acquiring bank shareholders (see Berger et al, 1999; and Pilloff and 
Santomero, 1998 for a review of the US literature). However, the latter offset the former 
implying insignificant joint returns to the combined bank (Houston and Ryngaert, 1994). 
On the contrary, European deals create value: gains accrue to target bank shareholders 
with no significant value destruction for acquiring bank shareholders (Cybo-Ottone, 2000; 
Beitel and Schiereck, 2001). The methodology has been applied to intra financial industry 
deals, cross-border deals, and pre-and-post risk valuation (see Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 
2000; DeLong, 2001; Amihud et al, 2002).  
 
It is important to determine whether M&A transactions involving acquiring banks from 
industrialised countries and target banks in emerging markets create value, and how value 
is distributed between the respective shareholders since distribution may involve a 
transfer of wealth between countries. Empirical evidence from the non-financial sector 
shows that the acquisition of majority control in EME firms creates value for 
shareholders, but value gains are unevenly distributed in favour of shareholders of 
acquiring firms in industrialised countries which involves a transfer of wealth from EME 
(Chari et al, 2004). Although the volume of cross-border bank M&A activity in EME is 
not as extensive as in the non-financial sector - due partly to regulatory restrictions and 
information asymmetries/the opacity of bank value (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001) – the 
pace of M&A is increasing due to regulatory reforms and technological developments.  
 
Whether the announcement of cross-border bank M&A transactions generates value is an 
empirical issue. For this purpose, we have identified 74 M&A transactions involving the 
acquisition of stakes in 46 listed target banks in EME between 1998 and 2005, using 
M&A transactions reported in Acquisitions Monthly with additional information about 
transactions and participating banks sourced from Thomson Analytics Banker One, 
Datastream, and BankScope. The transactions take place in three regions: Latin America, 
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Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia. In total, $1,057,515 million of EME bank assets 
were sold for $38,172 million (at 2000 prices). Over 56% of EME bank assets were sold 
in Asia but at a lower cost to acquiring banks compared to Latin America and CEE. The 
acquisition of stakes in Latin American banks accounted for more than 72% of the total 
value of M&A transactions with Latin bank assets the most expensive to buy.4  
 
The present study analyses value creation emanating from cross-border bank M&A 
transactions in EME. Event study methods measure value creation around the 
announcement date of transactions: we calculate cumulative abnormal returns to target 
bank shareholders, acquiring bank shareholders, and joint weighted returns (weighted by 
the market capitalisations of acquiring and target banks), respectively. A win-win 
situation occurs when joint returns are positive. Subsequently, we employ regression 
analysis to determine if returns are sensitive to the size of international bank holdings.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the event study 
methodology. Sample construction and data analysis are discussed in Section 3. There are 
two sets of empirical results: Section 4 is divided into two parts: first, cumulative 
abnormal returns are presented according to several criteria; second; the results from the 
regression of returns on ownership are shown. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Event study methodology  
Typically, three methodologies have been employed to quantify the effects of M&A 
activity: (1) dynamic efficiency studies (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997); (2) operating 
performance studies (see Altunbas and Marqués Ibáňez, 2004); and (3) event studies (see 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000, and Pilloff and Santomero, 1998). Since our objective is 
to quantify whether the announcement of cross-border M&A transactions creates value, 
the current study belongs to the third category. 
 
                                               
4 The assets of target banks, the value of deals, and cost per unit of asset for each region are as follows: 
Latin America ($278,994m, $27,578, $0.0988); CEE ($189,574m, $5,049m, $0.0266); Asia ($588,947m, 
$5,545m, $0.0094). Source: own calculations from Thomson and BankScope data. 
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Share price returns are calculated as the logarithmic difference between the share price 
index at day t and day t-1. The market model – see equation [1] - is used to estimate alpha 
and beta over an estimation period which spans -392 days to -130 days before the M&A 
announcement is made (on day 0). Although the choice of estimation period is arbitrary, 
we select a period commencing eighteen months and ending six months before the 
announcement date in order not to bias the estimates of alpha and beta with expectations 
of an impending M&A transaction. Abnormal returns to bank shareholders are measured 
as the difference between actual returns and predicted returns; the latter is derived using 
(constant) estimates of alpha and beta from OLS estimation of the market model (see 
Brown and Warner, 1985). Following convention, abnormal returns to target bank 
shareholders and acquiring bank shareholders are calculated. A measure of joint returns 
to the combined bank is constructed by summing the abnormal returns which are 
weighted by the target bank’s share and acquiring bank’s share of joint market 
capitalisation. In order to better approximate returns to international investors, returns are 
denominated in US dollars (except in a few cases where returns denominated in domestic 
currency are used. In all cases, market capitalisation must be dollar-denominated).  
 
The market model [1] is estimated for each target bank and acquiring bank. We select 
national stockmarket indexes as measures of the market but note that other authors have 
used national banking sector indexes and even the world banking sector index.  
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where itAR  is the abnormal return and itR  the raw return to bank i at time t; mtR  is the 
return to the stockmarket m at time t; i
^
a  is the estimated intercept and it
^
b the estimated 
beta which shows the sensitivity of the returns to each bank to stockmarket returns.  
 
The Brown and Warner (1980) t test statistic is used to determine if cumulative average 
abnormal returns are statistically significant. For day 0 the test statistic is given by: 
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Cumulative average abnormal returns are calculated across different event windows. 
Symmetric and non-symmetric window lengths account for features such as thin trading 
in EME stock markets and leakage effects prior to official announcements. 
 
3. Construction of Sample and Data  
We compiled the sample of M&A transactions after searching Acquisitions Monthly and 
identifying cross-border transactions involving acquiring banks from industrialised 
countries and target banks from EME. The 74 transactions precipitated an exchange of 
ownership rights in 46 EME banks. To supplement our analysis, we sourced information 
about each transaction from Thomson One Banker Analytics which contains the SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. We collected data on the value of the transaction, the 
percentage stake acquired in each transaction – which enabled us to establish a 
cumulative stake and classify the five types of acquisition with a dummy variable. 
Additional information was collected on the dollar price paid per share and the method of 
acquisition (open market purchase, tender offer, privately negotiated purchase, 
divestitures, stock swap, privatisation, other).  
 
The distribution of M&A transactions is shown in Table 1. The data are constructed to 
show acquisitions by European, North American, and developed Asian banks in the three 
emerging market regions: Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia. The 
following features emerge: European banks have been more active purchasers of 
emerging market bank assets using M&A as a point of entry into these markets. European 
banks acquired 34 EME banks over 58 separate transactions for $21,565 million whilst 
US banks acquired 9 banks over 11 deals for $16,480 million. This partly reflects 
strategic decisions by some US banks with existing presence in emerging markets to 
concentrate on organic growth rather than engaging in M&A.  
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Table 1 here 
 
From 1998 to 2005, only four international banks acquired stakes in banks in more than 
one emerging market region: a US bank, a UK bank, and two Dutch banks. Rather, 
European (excluding Spanish) banks acquired stakes in CEE targets whilst Spanish banks 
acquired stakes Latin America. The Spanish acquisitions accounted for 36% of the value 
of all M&A transactions in Latin America whereas the acquisition of stakes in two 
Mexican banks by two US banks accounted for 47%. The data suggest European, US, and 
developed-Asian nation banks are establishing a presence in Asian markets. European 
banks have acquired stakes in 12 Asian banks whilst US banks and banks from developed 
Asia acquired stakes in four banks each. More than 56% of the total value of Asian M&A 
transactions has been spent on acquiring stakes in 7 Korean banks. Although there are 
restrictions on foreign ownership, international banks have started to acquire stakes in 
Chinese and Indian targets: we suspect further stakes will be acquired by other banks and 
stakes will increase when current restrictions are lowered. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
The data are organised according to the size of ownership holdings in Table 2. It shows 
how international banks enter emerging market banking sectors. Based on the percentage 
stake acquired in each transaction and the cumulative stake held, we suggest international 
banks follow five modes of entry: (1) acquisition of majority stake (13 cases); (2) 
acquisition of minority stake (17 cases); (3) increasing existing minority stake (10 cases); 
(4) increasing minority stake to majority stake (15 cases); and (5) increasing majority 
stake (19 cases). Banks increasingly penetrated Latin American and CEE banking 
systems between 1998 and 2005; cumulatively, they acquired majority control, increased 
from minority to majority control, or increased majority stakes in 90.48% and 70% of 
transactions with Latin American and CEE targets, respectively. On the contrary, 
international banks acquired minority stakes in 52.17% of M&A transactions with Asian 
targets; the acquisition of majority control was made only in 17.39% of transactions. 
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4. Results 
The results are presented and discussed in two sub-sections. Section 4.1 classifies 
cumulative average abnormal returns in four ways to see the effect different factors might 
have on influencing how stockmarkets evaluate purchases of stakes in emerging market 
target banks. In section 4.2, a more rigorous examination of the relationship between 
returns and bank ownership is carried out using regression analysis. 
 
4.1 Analysis of cumulative average abnormal returns 
Table 3a-d shows cumulative abnormal returns by region; ownership; acquisition method; 
and acquirer nationality. Returns to target, acquirer, and combined bank shareholders are 
shown for different sized event windows. As expected, abnormal returns to target bank 
shareholders are higher than returns to acquiring bank shareholders: since the acquiring 
international banks are considerably larger it is their returns driving joint weighted 
returns. How do the abnormal returns to emerging market banks and the acquirers 
compare with those found elsewhere in the literature? Generally speaking, abnormal 
returns to US and European targets tend to be higher than the returns we calculate. For 
instance, Beitel and Schiereck (2001) report cumulative abnormal returns to European 
targets of 11.38%, 13.54% and 14.39% for the following event windows [-2, 0], [-2, +2] 
and [-10, +10]. Similar sized returns have been found in studies of US M&A. In terms of 
cumulative returns to acquiring banks, our results are consistent with the US and 
European results; returns are small and often negative. There is mixed evidence of value 
gains and losses to the combined bank from the US whilst European evidence points to 
significant value gains. Our evidence from emerging markets is more consistent with US 
results but the former are driven by returns to considerably larger acquiring banks. 
 
Table 3a here 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns are presented by region (see Table 3a). Whereas returns to 
Latin American targets are considerably larger than comparative returns to CEE and 
Asian targets – irrespective of event window length – the data indicate that acquiring 
banks’ stockmarkets do not value taking stakes in Latin banks. Across each event 
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window, value is lost and this drives joint returns. On the contrary, returns to acquiring 
bank shareholders are positive in the cases of CEE and Asian banks; whereas returns are 
less than 1% for acquisitions of Asian banks, the range between 1-1.5% of CEE banks 
(for longer window lengths only). We interpret win-win situations as significant positive 
joint returns to the combined bank: generally, acquisition of stakes in Asian banks yields 
a win-win outcome whereas it is found in longer window lengths for CEE banks. 
 
Table 3b here 
 
The returns data are expressed according to the size of stake acquired by international 
banks in their targets. The largest returns to target banks are found when international 
banks acquire majority control (D1 – but only in the longer windows) and increase an 
existing minority stake (D3 – but only in the short windows). However, the purchase of 
stakes which convert international banks’ minority holding to a majority yields 
significant negative returns in all but two windows. The returns to acquiring banks 
tentatively suggests that stockmarkets positively value the acquisition of majority control 
(D1) and increase in existing majority holdings (D5) in the case of emerging market bank 
investments. This produces a joint return of more than 1% when existing majority stakes 
are increased but acquisition of majority control is mostly insignificant (see Table 3b). 
 
Table 3b here 
 
Tables 3c and d examine returns by the method of acquisition and nationality of acquiring 
bank. Target returns similar in size to those reported by Beitel and Schiereck (2001) for 
European banks (see above) are found when emerging market banks are acquired via a 
tender offer. Returns to targets are relatively large when the method of acquisition is a 
stock swap, and privately negotiated purchase albeit to a lesser extent. Surprisingly, open 
market purchases of bank stock leads to very large, negative returns; privatisation also 
yields negative returns. The data show that only privately negotiated purchases produce a 
positive and mostly significant gain to acquiring banks and this generates a joint return of 
around 1% across the different window lengths (see Table 3c). 
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Table 3c and 3d here 
 
Finally, returns are presented according to the nationality of the acquiring bank. Win-win 
situations are found when US banks and Dutch banks acquire an emerging market target 
(but not in all windows). There is a contrast in the joint returns: returns are positive and 
high for longer window lengths for US banks but negative for Dutch banks: yet, returns 
across the shorter windows are positive and significant for Dutch banks. Whereas UK 
bank and Spanish bank purchases yield significant returns to target banks, the joint 
returns are significantly negative due to unfavourable stockmarket reactions in Spain and 
the UK (see Table 3d). 
 
4.2 Cumulative abnormal returns and ownership in target banks 
One of our objectives is to examine the relationship between abnormal returns and the 
level of stake acquired in emerging market target banks by international banks. In the 
dataset, we qualify the size of holding purchased at each acquisition and we use this 
information to construct explanatory variables. As noted above, in the non-financial 
sector a transfer of wealth from emerging markets to industrialised countries has taken 
place when majority control is acquired (see Chari et al, 2004). In the case of banking 
markets, the data presented above suggest the opposite occurs. We formally test the 
proposition that acquisition of majority control is a determinant of abnormal returns. In 
constructing the sample, we collected performance data of banks (using financial ratio 
analysis), country level indicators of macroeconomic performance and environment, and 
stockmarket trends. Subsequent step-wise regression analysis was used to identify 
variables of interest. The preferred regression model is presented in equation [2]. 
 
( )
( )
it1t171t16
155.0t1413121t,i11
1098761t,i5
1t,i4i3i2i1iit
INFCR
03YrDEMEBearAsiaCEERoET
TenderOpenEuroSpainUSTAAln
TATlnMinMajDFirstDMajDCAR
e+b+b+
-b+-b+b+b+-b+
b+b+b+b+b+-b+
-b+-b+-b+-b+a=
--
--
-
-
 [2] 
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Where C itAR = cumulative abnormal return for bank i in period t ;  
D-Maji combines D1 and D5 and represents purchase of or increase in majority holding; 
D-Firsti combines D1 and D2 and represents initial purchase of stake; 
D-MinMaji is D4 and denotes conversion of minority holding to majority;  
T-TA = natural log of (real) assets of target bank in period t -1;  
A-TA = natural log of (real) assets of acquiring bank in period t -1;  
US = equal to 1 when acquiring bank is from the United States and zero otherwise;  
Spain = equals to 1 when acquiring bank is from Spain and zero otherwise;  
Euro = equal to 1 when acquiring bank is European (excl. Spain) and zero otherwise;  
Open = equals 1 when method of purchase is open market transaction and zero otherwise;  
Tender = equal to 1 when method of purchase is tender offer and zero otherwise;  
T-RoE = return on equity to target bank in period t -1;  
CEE = equal to 1 when target bank is located in C. & E. Europe and zero otherwise;  
Asia = equal to 1 when target bank is located in Asia and zero otherwise;  
Bear-EME = cumulative fall in EME stockmarkets in six months before announcement;  
D-Yr03 = equal to 1 for the year 2003;  
CR = 5-firm assets concentration ratio for target banking sector in period t -1;  
INF = rate of change in inflation change between period t and t – 1. 
 
Equation [2] is estimated using bank cumulative returns for each of the seven window 
lengths as dependent variables. Although our primary interest lies in the relationship 
between returns to target banks and ownership, the model is also estimated for acquiring 
banks and combined banks. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics. It is immediately 
noticeable that the mean CAR for target banks is higher with a much larger standard 
deviation compared with acquiring banks. The average target bank has $14,291 million of 
assets compared to $459,001 million for the average acquiring bank.  
 
Table 4 here 
 
The results of estimating equation [2] on target bank returns are shown in Table 5a. The 
model specification explains from 17% to 41% of the variation in target bank returns. The 
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results strongly suggest that majority purchase significantly lowers target bank returns 
(but the relationship is insignificant although still negatively signed in some windows). 
On the contrary, initial purchases appear to raise returns yet the coefficients are 
insignificant. Converting minority holdings to majority stakes also significantly lowers 
target returns. Most of the significant relationships are observed in the shorter event 
windows, which is suggestive of initial adverse reactions tailing off as window lengths 
increase. The opposite is found with respect to the nationality of the acquiring bank: 
relationships become more significant over longer window lengths (involving 10 days or 
more). The method of purchase enters most models significantly with open market 
purchases lowering returns and tender offers increasing them. As expected, better 
performing targets (measured by RoE) produce higher returns though the relationship is 
not significant across all window lengths. An Asian location is associated with 
significantly lower returns whereas a CEE location lowers returns but only in two 
windows. Bear markets, heavily concentrated banking sectors, and poor inflation 
performance all lead to lower returns with the latter most significant. 
 
Table 5a here 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, bank asset size does not enter the models for target returns in a 
significant fashion. However, in explaining cumulative abnormal returns to acquiring 
banks, the acquisition of a large target bank in the emerging markets lowers returns but 
only significantly in the windows [-10, +1] and [-10, +2]. In the latter window, the 
acquisition of an initial stake in a target also significantly reduces returns whilst moving 
from minority to majority owner significantly lessens returns in the [-15, +15] window 
only. The models explain far less of the variation in acquiring bank returns. Of 
importance are the method of acquisition, and to a lesser extent, acquiring bank 
nationality since returns are positively significant when US banks enter an emerging 
market (but only in the two longest windows). As noted earlier, joint returns are driven by 
acquiring bank returns. Hence, joint returns are influenced by the nationality of the 
acquiring bank (in shorter windows) and method of acquisition (in longer windows). 
There is little evidence of a relationship between joint returns and bank ownership.  
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Tables 5b and c here 
 
5. Conclusion 
We construct a sample of cross-border bank M&A transactions between international 
banks and target banks in emerging markets covering 74 transactions involving 46 targets 
between 1998 and 2005. The transactions involved a small number of acquiring European 
and US banks, and targets from Latin America, CEE, and Asia. Whilst over 50% of bank 
assets were sold in Asia, Latin American targets accounted for over 72% of the value of 
transactions. The cost per unit of bank assets is much greater for Latin American targets 
especially compared with Asian targets, which could reflect the sale of formerly troubled 
banks following the Asian crisis. It appears international banks have consolidated and 
increased their majority control in Latin America and CEE whereas they started to enter 
Asian markets post-1998.  
 
Our analysis of cumulative average abnormal returns shows some consistency with 
results obtained from the US and Europe. Generally, returns to targets are larger than 
returns to acquirers. However, due to sizeable discrepancies in the market values of 
targets and acquirers, returns to the latter drive joint returns to the combined bank. 
Nevertheless, inter-regional differences in returns are observed: acquisitions of Asian 
banks tend to produce a win-win situation despite returns to targets being much larger for 
Latin American targets. Similarly, a win-win occurs when international banks increase 
existing majority holdings in emerging market targets. The largest returns to targets are 
found when stakes are acquired via a tender offer; yet, joint returns are significantly 
positive only when deals are privately negotiated. Win-win situations are sensitive to the 
nationality of acquiring banks: markets appear to value US and Dutch bank purchases but 
the results are not consistent across every window length. 
 
The econometric models of target bank returns have reasonable explanatory power. 
Nevertheless, we cannot observe a positive relationship between international bank 
ownership and emerging market bank returns, which is inconsistent with evidence from 
the non-financial sector. Although, the relationships between initial purchases of stakes in 
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emerging market banks are positively signed, they are insignificant. On the contrary, 
majority control and movement from minority to majority owners are often inverse and 
significant with respect to returns. This suggests there are considerable perceived risks 
associated with expanding banking operations into emerging markets which are not 
evident in the non-financial sector. Thus, we find no evidence to support suggestions of a 
transfer of wealth from shareholders in emerging markets to their counterparts in 
industrialised markets. 
 
There are few common factors explaining target and acquiring bank returns: method of 
acquisition and nationality of acquiring bank are significant predictors in both cases. The 
data show acquiring bank returns are lowered when large targets are purchased. As above, 
the assumption of additional risk is a likely explanation for this relationship. We suggest 
stockmarket perceptions regarding cross-border M&A transactions in emerging markets 
reflect information asymmetries associated with valuing opaque bank assets, and 
uncertainties associated with investing in banks in financial systems that have been under 
distress in recent times. In a small number of transactions, ownership rights are limited by 
regulations, for instance, China and India. Nevertheless, we expect the consolidation of 
global banking to continue as current regulations on foreign ownership of domestic banks 
are lowered over time. Similarly, more banks facing increasingly competitive domestic 
markets, may seek out shareholder value in EME that offer potential for expansion and 
diversification. As a caveat, we note abnormal return represents market assessment of 
expected return from M&A transactions. Further study is required to ascertain the 
market’s valuation of, and also the determinants of, longer-term bank performance 
following cross-border M&A transactions in EME. 
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Table 1: Distribution of M&A transactions; by Region, 1998-2005 
 
  No. of deals No. of 
targets 
Value, 
 $ m 
Share of 
value, % 
Average 
value, $ m 
EUR-CEE 18 10 4,144.00 10.86 230.22 
EUR-LAT 26 12 14,601.80 38.25 561.61 
EUR-ASIA 14 12 2,819.00 7.39 201.36 
Asia-Asia 5 3 852.80 2.23 170.56 
NA-CEE 3 1 969.50 2.54 323.17 
NA-LAT 4 4 13,265.90 34.75 3,316.48 
NA-ASIA 4 4 2,244.30 5.88 561.08 
Total EME 74 46 38,171.65 100.00 515.83 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of M&A transactions; by Ownership Stake, 1998-2005 
 
Holding Value, $ m % share Average, $ 
m 
Deals 
D1 – acquire majority (> 50%) 81,608 7.72% 6,278 13 
D2 – acquire minority (< 50%) 520,438 49.21% 30,614 17 
D3 – increase minority  
(from n < 50% to < 50%) 
114,202 10.80% 11,420 10 
D4 – minority to majority 
(from < 50% to > 50%) 
152,557 14.43% 10,170 15 
D5 – increase majority (from n > 50%) 188,710 17.84% 9,932 19 
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Table 3a: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns; by Region (%) 
 
Region Latin America CEE Asia All Regions 
Returns to Target banks     
CAR[-2,0] 4.1956*** 0.2663 1.1356** 2.1294*** 
CAR[-2,1] 3.4930*** 1.7890*** 1.9309*** 2.5239*** 
CAR[-2,2] 4.5312*** 2.9803*** 1.7866*** 3.2380*** 
CAR[-10,-1] 3.7582*** 0.4946*** 0.0152 1.6687*** 
CAR[-10,2] 7.0863*** 2.8545 1.3803 4.1119*** 
CAR[-10,10] 6.6369*** 0.6378*** -0.1898 2.8126*** 
CAR[-15,15] 4.8556*** 0.6680*** -2.6770*** 1.3260*** 
Returns to Acquiring banks     
CAR[-2,0] -0.2316*** 0.4707** 0.1612 0.0898 
CAR[-2,1] -0.4768*** 0.3019 0.6866*** 0.1058 
CAR[-2,2] -1.3955*** 0.3554** 0.6850*** -0.2520*** 
CAR[-10,-1] -0.5872*** 1.1775*** 0.3413*** 0.2022*** 
CAR[-10,2] -1.9476*** 1.5660 0.8849 -0.0701 
CAR[-10,10] -1.4748*** 1.2006*** 0.2923*** -0.1663*** 
CAR[-15,15] -0.4500*** 1.4461*** 0.3624*** 0.3406*** 
Returns to Combined banks     
CAR[-2,0] -0.0939 0.2461 0.5987*** 0.2178** 
CAR[-2,1] -0.3465*** 0.1346 1.0795*** 0.2333*** 
CAR[-2,2] -1.1443*** 0.1598 1.0582*** -0.0897 
CAR[-10,-1] -0.5852*** 1.3829*** 0.6440*** 0.3554*** 
CAR[-10,2] -1.7145*** 1.6281 1.2344 0.1506 
CAR[-10,10] -1.2377*** 0.7292*** 0.3775*** -0.1775*** 
CAR[-15,15] -0.5178*** 0.9203*** -0.1769*** -0.0037 
 
***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
 20 
Table 3b: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns; by Ownership Stake (%) 
 
Ownership stake D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
Returns to Target banks      
CAR[-2,0] 2.4169*** 2.7961*** 6.9518*** -2.3316*** 2.5587*** 
CAR[-2,1] 2.9182*** 4.9108*** 7.1732*** -4.1859*** 3.1925*** 
CAR[-2,2] 3.6316*** 5.1096*** 6.1181*** -2.2720*** 4.2592*** 
CAR[-10,-1] 2.4801*** 1.9561*** -1.2313*** 3.6303*** 0.6386*** 
CAR[-10,2] 6.4345** 5.3357* 3.6286 1.8554 3.3160 
CAR[-10,10] 6.0599*** 2.3688*** 2.7149*** -0.5075*** 3.4845*** 
CAR[-15,15] 5.7613*** 1.0143*** 0.3096* -4.7002*** 3.5758*** 
Returns to Acquiring banks      
CAR[-2,0] 0.2023 -0.6311*** -0.0381 0.8081*** 0.1454 
CAR[-2,1] 0.0838 -0.4491** 0.1679 0.4167** 0.3437** 
CAR[-2,2] 0.3756** -0.5785*** 0.1667 -1.1572*** 0.0940 
CAR[-10,-1] 0.5860*** -0.7914*** -0.0146 -0.7747*** 1.6822*** 
CAR[-10,2] 1.3470 -1.1116 0.1472 -2.7378** 1.8207 
CAR[-10,10] 0.8597*** -1.1161*** 0.1583 -2.3595*** 1.5050*** 
CAR[-15,15] 1.9112*** -0.4949*** 1.8381*** -3.7975*** 2.4883*** 
Returns to Combined banks      
CAR[-2,0] -0.3105 0.2524 0.2462 0.7831*** 0.1165 
CAR[-2,1] -0.5026** 0.4670** 0.5189** 0.4549** 0.2561 
CAR[-2,2] -0.3011* 0.3401** 0.6188*** -0.9871*** 0.0544 
CAR[-10,-1] 0.6242*** -0.1616 -0.3410** -0.2245* 1.4075*** 
CAR[-10,2] 0.6737 0.0671 0.0053 -1.9045 1.5312 
CAR[-10,10] 0.0006 -0.0063 0.1027 -2.3346*** 1.1083*** 
CAR[-15,15] 0.5172*** 0.1789*** 1.9470*** -4.0382*** 1.7103*** 
 
Note:  
D1 indicates the acquisition of majority control. 
D2 indicates the acquisition of a minority stake. 
D3 indicates the increase of an existing minority stake. 
D4 indicates increased ownership from minority to majority. 
D5 indicates increasing an existing majority stake. 
 
***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3c: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns; by Type of Acquisition (%) 
 
Type of acquisition Open market Tender offer Private neg Stock swap Privatisation Other 
Returns to Target banks       
CAR[-2,0] -2.0118*** 4.6940*** 2.2928*** 7.7097*** -1.5879** -1.3096** 
CAR[-2,1] -4.5644*** 7.8447*** 3.5198*** 6.8984*** -1.3480** -4.2166*** 
CAR[-2,2] -6.4300*** 10.7396*** 3.5606*** 7.0092*** -0.4255 -4.5170*** 
CAR[-10,-1] -2.9657*** 3.3416*** 0.6299*** 0.4390 -4.2846*** 9.0138*** 
CAR[-10,2] -9.4030** 13.3619*** 3.3040 7.2275* -3.5229 3.9823 
CAR[-10,10] -9.8522*** 11.0897*** 2.9383*** 8.7419*** -4.5922*** 2.3351*** 
CAR[-15,15] -12.6598*** 10.0020*** 0.7579*** 8.2070*** -2.9548*** 0.5432*** 
Returns to Acquiring banks       
CAR[-2,0] 0.4633** 0.0016 0.0730 -0.7475** -0.1092 0.4784 
CAR[-2,1] 0.3112* -0.4783*** 0.2909** -1.3366*** -1.3942*** 1.4877*** 
CAR[-2,2] -1.0926*** -1.0114*** 0.4461*** -2.6575*** -2.9978*** 1.8375*** 
CAR[-10,-1] -1.3066*** 0.5443*** 0.8591*** -0.7567*** -0.1404 -0.6956*** 
CAR[-10,2] -2.8093** -0.3054 1.1716 -3.4109* -4.4129 1.4388 
CAR[-10,10] -3.8709*** 0.9899*** 0.9698*** -1.8820*** 0.5683*** -0.2147* 
CAR[-15,15] -5.3909*** 1.7810*** 0.7895*** -2.8470*** 3.3347*** 1.5013*** 
Returns to Combined banks       
CAR[-2,0] 0.4449** 0.0410 0.5820*** -0.6549** -0.8367* 0.3096 
CAR[-2,1] 0.0913 -0.2526 0.8588*** -1.2904*** -2.2647*** 1.2497*** 
CAR[-2,2] -1.1817*** -0.6017*** 0.9669*** -2.5193*** -3.7747*** 1.3945*** 
CAR[-10,-1] -1.5184*** 0.9406*** 0.9998*** -0.5711*** -0.5247** -0.1497 
CAR[-10,2] -3.1646** 0.4778 1.6615 -2.9163 -5.2094* 1.2178 
CAR[-10,10] -4.6591*** 1.0722*** 1.3550*** -1.7893*** 0.2993* 0.0280 
CAR[-15,15] -6.3224*** 1.9977*** 0.7282*** -2.6438*** 2.9261*** 0.6432*** 
 
***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3d: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns; by Nationality of Acquirer (%) 
 
Nationality of Acquirers US European Dutch Spain UK 
Returns to Target banks      
CAR[-2,0] 2.1186*** -0.7347** 3.7503*** 2.7291*** 5.9066*** 
CAR[-2,1] 1.5013*** 0.3104 6.3440*** 2.2118*** 4.1524*** 
CAR[-2,2] 1.2516*** 0.9241*** 6.9481*** 3.7130*** 5.2814*** 
CAR[-10,-1] 3.9580*** 0.3125 -3.3150*** 2.6099*** 5.0400*** 
CAR[-10,2] 4.3399 1.4086 2.7302 4.7721** 9.9604 
CAR[-10,10] 6.2277*** -1.9934*** 2.8828*** 3.9360*** 8.2538*** 
CAR[-15,15] 3.1551*** -0.3803*** -2.2800*** 2.0635*** 7.9943*** 
Returns to Acquiring banks      
CAR[-2,0] -0.3344 0.2222 0.9572*** 0.0693 -0.7539*** 
CAR[-2,1] -0.0713 -0.0656 1.9295*** -0.3842** -1.0611*** 
CAR[-2,2] 0.0285 0.0142 1.7617*** -1.5606*** -0.8849*** 
CAR[-10,-1] 1.3583*** 1.1437*** 0.1932 -1.1833*** 0.0605 
CAR[-10,2] 1.6947 1.2388 1.3968 -2.8478*** -1.3408 
CAR[-10,10] 0.9634*** 1.3205*** -0.2687*** -2.1750*** -0.6513*** 
CAR[-15,15] 1.6219*** 1.9707*** 0.0161 -1.1362*** -0.8978*** 
Returns to Combined banks      
CAR[-2,0] -0.2599 -0.0157 0.5234** 0.1433 -0.5483** 
CAR[-2,1] 0.0045 -0.2529 1.3928*** -0.3234** -0.8090*** 
CAR[-2,2] 0.1900 -0.2234 1.1576*** -1.3506*** -0.6294*** 
CAR[-10,-1] 1.3454*** 1.4302*** -0.0939 -1.3664*** 0.1900 
CAR[-10,2] 1.8303 1.2315 0.6351 -2.7923*** -1.0466 
CAR[-10,10] 1.1589*** 0.9609*** -1.5693*** -1.9487*** -0.8071*** 
CAR[-15,15] 1.9586*** 1.4266*** -1.6333*** -1.2832*** -0.7689*** 
 
Note: European excludes transactions involving Dutch, Spanish and British banks. 
 
***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics – Abnormal Returns & Covariates, % 
 
 Mean Median Std dev Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variables 
TCAR[-2,0] 2.1294 1.0641 7.7771 -12.4985 39.8334 
TCAR[-2,1] 2.5239 1.1251 10.3660 -36.5000 41.0337 
TCAR[-2,2] 3.2380 1.5464 11.9921 -39.1861 41.8326 
TCAR[-10,-1] 1.6687 0.1918 9.0055 -22.4191 45.5973 
TCAR[-10,2] 4.1119 2.0905 14.9402 -46.9198 43.6999 
TCAR[-10,10] 2.8126 2.2372 15.5745 -53.6214 45.1807 
TCAR[-15,15] 1.3260 3.1740 17.6767 -60.7135 54.3613 
ACAR[-2,0] 0.0898 0.0845 2.6345 -10.1437 7.4755 
ACAR[-2,1] 0.1058 0.0363 3.2456 -10.8770 10.5809 
ACAR[-2,2] -0.2520 -0.0447 3.2725 -12.1443 9.6835 
ACAR[-10,-1] 0.2022 0.0610 3.9460 -14.0316 9.0708 
ACAR[-10,2] -0.0701 0.0618 5.3185 -18.5929 9.9714 
ACAR[-10,10] -0.1663 -0.2158 5.8528 -17.7270 12.1171 
ACAR[-15,15] 0.3406 0.1235 6.9075 -24.0261 20.8729 
JCAR[-2,0] 0.2178 0.1342 2.7883 -10.8736 8.2283 
JCAR[-2,1] 0.2333 0.2779 3.3539 -11.2072 9.7845 
JCAR[-2,2] -0.0897 0.0315 3.4211 -13.4319 8.6918 
JCAR[-10,-1] 0.3554 0.6445 3.9746 -15.0261 9.3512 
JCAR[-10,2] 0.1506 0.5943 5.5921 -19.8620 11.0090 
JCAR[-10,10] -0.1775 0.0059 6.0962 -21.6439 16.8358 
JCAR[-15,15] -0.0037 0.4295 7.2477 -30.9182 20.7399 
Ownership 
Majority 0.4324 0.0000 0.4954 0.0000 1.0000 
Initial purchase 0.4054 0.0000 0.4910 0.0000 1.0000 
Min. to maj. 0.2027 0.0000 0.4020 0.0000 1.0000 
Bank size ($ million, 2000 prices) 
Target 14,290.7 6,853.0 25,059.1 62.4 184,268.3 
Acquirer  459,001.1 408,460.8 260,199.9 613.6 1,276,778.0 
Nationality of acquiring bank 
US 0.1351 0.0000 0.3419 0.0000 1.0000 
SPA 0.2838 0.0000 0.4508 0.0000 1.0000 
Euro-all 0.4595 0.0000 0.4984 0.0000 1.0000 
Method of acquisition 
Open 0.1757 0.0000 0.3805 0.0000 1.0000 
Tender 0.2432 0.0000 0.4290 0.0000 1.0000 
Target profitability 
RoE 4.2760 11.3747 22.6662 -70.6592 35.4463 
Geographic region of target 
CEE 0.2838 0.0000 0.4508 0.0000 1.0000 
Asia 0.3108 0.0000 0.4628 0.0000 1.0000 
Other controls 
Bear market - EME -10.89 0.00 16.30 -65.54 17.23 
Year 2003 0.0946 0.0000 0.2927 0.0000 1.0000 
Concentration ratio 0.5664 0.5736 0.0981 0.3630 0.8432 
Inflation change 6.78 5.50 5.30 -0.80 35.80 
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Table 5a: Estimation of Equation [2] - Target Banks 
 
Predictor TCAR[-2,0] TCAR[-2,1] TCAR[-2,2] TCAR[-10,-1] TCAR[-10,2] TCAR[-10,10] TCAR[-15,15] 
Constant 17.050 24.600 8.550 39.230* 45.790 60.580* 19.180 
D-Maj -2.736 -6.901** -6.160* -2.312 -6.890* -3.812 -0.335 
D-First  -1.552 1.137 2.125 1.402 4.194 1.165 1.472 
D-Minmaj -9.913*** -14.255*** -11.372*** 0.197 -7.984* -7.788 -9.599 
T-TA 0.111 -0.401 0.728 -0.733 -0.330 -0.184 0.587 
A-TA -0.176 0.491 0.904 -0.755 0.271 -0.324 1.303 
US -0.707 -4.740 -7.524 -9.267** -15.500** -11.196 -9.556 
SPA -3.885 -5.633 -5.000 -10.630** -15.461** -17.185** -13.131 
Euro -1.989 -7.324* -9.046* -10.030** -16.651*** -16.423*** -12.182 
Open -3.657 -5.246* -8.153** -5.706** -13.256*** -11.661** -12.613** 
Tender 4.393** 8.992*** 11.598*** 0.767 12.128*** 9.160** 9.739* 
RoE 0.101** 0.069 0.048 0.076 0.117* 0.105 0.157* 
CEE -6.840** 0.133 2.028 -6.257* -4.884 -9.335 -8.525 
Asia -7.823** -6.961* -5.698 -10.425*** -14.972*** -18.003*** -15.870** 
Bear - EME -3.815 -14.302** -18.362** 1.645 -17.141* 4.690 0.970 
Y03 0.412 7.219* 8.414* 1.883 8.456* 6.669 4.565 
Conc -5.460 -21.720* -22.320 -6.010 -29.630* -39.110* -30.710 
INF -23.130 -46.810** -45.710* -48.640** -91.140*** -83.670** -58.250 
R2-adjusted 19.40% 34.30% 31.80% 17% 41% 33% 17.20% 
DW 2.077 2.319 2.274 1.950 2.338 2.573 2.501 
 
Table 5b: Estimation of Equation [2] - Acquiring Banks  
 
Predictor ACAR[-2,0] ACAR[-2,1] ACAR[-2,2] ACAR[-10,-1] ACAR[-10,2] ACAR[-10,10] ACAR[-15,15]
Constant -5.548 -6.288 -2.354 16.070 16.830 23.460 36.880**
D-Maj 1.066 1.686 1.201 1.727 2.388 0.663 -0.295
D-First  -0.374 -1.324 -1.407 -1.889 -2.757* -1.997 -2.376
D-Minmaj 1.509 1.262 0.000 -0.387 -1.626 -2.132 -5.676**
T-TA -0.010 -0.036 -0.004 -0.763* -0.904* -1.029 -1.072
A-TA 0.506 0.655 0.459 -0.123 -0.030 -0.667 -1.361
US -1.426 -2.148 -1.565 3.211 2.930 5.518* 6.142*
SPA -0.231 -1.964 -2.393 -1.278 -3.192 0.073 0.893
Euro -0.717 -1.463 -0.916 1.970 1.342 3.484 4.063
Open 0.265 -0.315 -1.226 -1.942 -3.236* -4.260* -6.248***
Tender -0.565 -1.484 -2.041* -1.065 -2.705* -0.181 0.177
RoE 0.002 0.015 0.003 0.013 0.010 0.005 0.019
CEE 1.105 0.223 0.557 -0.139 -0.037 0.484 -0.557
Asia 1.560 1.901 1.502 0.041 0.560 0.292 -1.885
Bear - EME 2.373 3.395 3.912 3.084 6.086 -1.233 -0.548
Y03 -0.672 -0.730 -1.150 -1.881 -2.742 -1.335 -1.950
Conc -2.413 -1.853 -3.340 -13.033* -11.215 -11.358 -13.640
INF 3.134 8.932 2.142 -0.270 0.310 -7.660 -13.080
R2-adjusted 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.00% 16.10% 1.30% 9.30%
DW 2.172 2.136 2.160 2.270 2.426 2.240 2.270
 
***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5c: Estimation of Equation [2] - Combined Banks  
 
Predictor JCAR[-2,0] JCAR[-2,1] JCAR[-2,2] JCAR[-10,-1] JCAR[-10,2] JCAR[-10,10] JCAR[-15,15]
Constant -0.822 -0.424 4.245 20.430* 24.250* 30.130* 27.310
D-Maj -0.052 0.229 -0.378 1.030 0.536 -1.123 -1.966
D-First  -0.529 -1.442 -1.611 -1.585 -2.605 -1.831 -2.296
D-Minmaj 0.447 0.083 -1.291 -0.162 -2.127 -3.249 -6.566**
T-TA -0.046 -0.080 -0.029 -0.702* -0.848 -0.673 -0.510
A-TA 0.400 0.483 0.255 -0.440 -0.363 -1.069 -0.895
US -3.077* -3.793* -3.283* 1.601 0.286 2.785 4.018
SPA -1.961 -3.750* -4.178** -3.143 -6.091** -2.337 -0.959
Euro -2.555* -3.373** -3.052* 0.686 -1.442 0.194 1.383
Open -0.041 -0.881 -1.640 -2.488* -4.161* -5.384** -6.790***
Tender -0.413 -1.049 -1.298 -0.664 -1.613 0.431 1.228
RoE 0.007 0.019 0.009 0.013 0.015 0.010 0.018
CEE 0.768 0.060 0.440 -0.499 -0.299 0.314 -0.915
Asia 0.987 1.249 0.799 -0.559 -0.518 -0.990 -2.950
Bear - EME 2.542 2.929 3.248 3.729 5.837 -1.367 2.182
Y03 -0.749 -0.785 -0.925 -2.288 -2.948 -1.367 -2.473
Conc -2.740 -2.419 -4.525 -11.517* -11.176 -12.230 -10.560
INF 1.181 6.885 -0.510 4.360 2.090 -10.980 -11.240
R2-adjusted 0.00% 0.00% 0.30% 4.40% 10.10% 0.00% 6.00%
DW 2.304 2.308 2.363 2.466 2.565 2.304 2.348
 
***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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